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It is often argued that many economies are affected by conditions in foreign countries. This paper explores
the connection between interest rates in major industrial countries and annual real output growth in
other countries. The results show that high foreign interest rates have a contractionary effect on annual
real GDP growth in the domestic economy, but that this effect is centered on countries with fixed exchange
rates. The paper then examines the potential channels through which major-country interest rates affect
other economies. The effect of foreign interest rates on domestic interest rates is the most likely channel















Discussions of globalization often assert that the fortunes of many countries are driven by
other major economies. Conventional wisdom holds that conditions in major countries often
spill over to other economies, which then experience volatility for reasons independent of
domestic policies (e.g., International Monetary Fund 2007). One manifestation of this idea
is that major country interest rates have a strong impact on conditions in other countries.
At the same time, the open economy \trilemma" and empirical tests of it suggest that only
countries with pegged exchange rate regimes give up their domestic monetary autonomy.1
This loss of autonomy then implies a potential channel through which foreign interest rates
can a®ect pegs and °oats di®erently, with pegs being directly a®ected by foreign interest
rates and °oats insulated from these rates.2
This paper answers two questions. First, what is the e®ect of interest rates in base
countries on other countries' annual real GDP growth?3 Second, how does this e®ect vary by
the exchange rate regime and other country characteristics? Answering the second question
helps to disentangle the channels through which foreign country interest rates a®ect other
economies. We ¯nd that annual real output growth in countries is negatively associated with
interest rates in their base countries, but that this e®ect holds only for countries with ¯xed
exchange rates. This ¯nding holds across a wide set of speci¯cations, a variety of controls
for time and base- and domestic-country characteristics, and various sub-samples. The
results are also robust to concerns of endogeneity of exchange rate regimes, as well as other
simultaneity concerns, such as correlated shocks across the base and domestic countries.4 In
addition, the results are presented across di®erent empirical models (¯xed e®ect panel and
random coe±cients models) and hold even more strongly when using investment growth
rather than GDP growth.
The main ¯nding thus implies that there are real costs to the loss of monetary autonomy
that comes with pegging and provides further support for the hypothesis that interest rates
can have substantial e®ects on the real economy. There may be bene¯ts to pegging, but
changing the interest rate to maintain the peg will have consequences for the economy.
1The trilemma is the conjecture that at any one time a country can pursue only two of the three following
options: a ¯xed exchange rate, open capital markets, and monetary autonomy; this is the case because a ¯xed
exchange rate and open capital markets will imply by interest parity that a country has lost its monetary
autonomy.
2A \peg" will henceforth refer to a country whose exchange rate stays within a prescribed range, while
\°oat" and \nonpeg" will be used interchangeably to refer to any country that is not pegged.
3The \base country" is the country to which a country pegs or the country to which it would peg if it were
pegged. For nonpegs, the base is base is determined by previous pegging history, cultural and historical ties,
dominant regional economies, as well as a close reading of each currency's history. See Section 3.1, Appendix
A and Table A1 for more details.
4These issues are further discussed in Sections 2 and 3.2.2.
1Speci¯cally, base-country interest rates that are 1 percentage point higher lead to a 0.20
percentage point decline in annual GDP growth in pegged countries as opposed to no change
in countries with °oats.
Turning to the channels underlying this result, we ¯nd that base rates have an impact on
domestic interest rates and the impact is much stronger for pegs, while they do not appear
to have an e®ect on variables such as exports to the base country. These ¯ndings, along
with the di®erences seen across exchange rate regimes, suggest that the direct interest
rate channel may be the primary channel through which base interest rates a®ect other
countries, and are consistent with recent evidence that while many countries may show
\fear of °oating," interest rates in countries that actually do °oat show far less connection
to base interest rates than countries that peg (Shambaugh 2004 and Obstfeld, Shambaugh
and Taylor 2004, 2005).
This paper is related to two literatures: (i) the impact of domestic monetary policy on
the economy, and (ii) the impact of major economies on other countries' business cycles.
While not studying monetary policy per se, we are interested in the way interest rates a®ect
the economy. There is an extensive literature on the impact of domestic monetary policy
on the economy, which is too broad to distill here.5 One paper that is related to the present
study, however, is di Giovanni, McCrary and von Wachter (2005), who use the EMS/ERM
period as a quasi-experimental setting to test for the causal impact of domestic monetary
policy by instrumenting other European interest rates with the German one in order to test
for the impact of domestic monetary policy, and ¯nd a strong e®ect.6
The literature on how industrial countries a®ect less-developed countries' economies is
also relevant. Dornbusch (1985) considers the role of large country business cycles in deter-
mining commodity prices and, subsequently, other outcomes for less-developed countries.
Recently, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) analyze the role of °uctuations in domestic interest
rates on the business cycle of small open economies, where the interest rate is decomposed
into an international rate and a country risk component. There have also been several
attempts to untangle the impact of large country interest rates on domestic annual GDP
growth. Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) consider a variety of North-South links when exam-
ining Group of Three (G-3) interest rate and exchange rate volatility, and ¯nd that the U.S.
real interest rate a®ects growth in some regions. Frankel and Roubini (2001) also ¯nd a neg-
ative e®ect of G-7 real interest rates on less-developed countries' output. Since these papers
consider many aspects of North-South relations, they do not have space to consider in detail
5See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) for discussion.
6The present paper does not focus on identi¯ed monetary policy but on the total impact of foreign
interest rates in order to better understand the way foreign conditions and linkages a®ect domestic annual
GDP growth across a large set of countries.
2how major-country interest rates and the domestic economy are connected. In addition to
these studies, there have been a number of papers that use vector autoregressions (VARs)
to explore the transmission of international business cycles.7 A notable contribution is Kim
(2001), who ¯nds that U.S. interest rates have an impact on output in the other six G-7
countries. This paper is one of the few to examine the potential channels through which
the interest rate has an e®ect. It ¯nds virtually no trade impact and that the impact on
output comes from a reduction in the world interest rate.8
What has been absent from the study of foreign rates' impact on the real economy,
though, is conditioning on the role of the exchange rate regime in the transmission of the
foreign interest rate on the domestic economy.9 The present paper uncovers the impact
of major country interest rates on other countries while paying particular attention to the
way the exchange rate regime may a®ect the transmission. By including a broad panel
of countries that have di®erent base countries, the present study uses time controls and
focuses on the speci¯c e®ect of the base interest rate. Thus, our panel allows us to strip out
both individual country e®ects and worldwide movements in growth rates providing a better
identi¯cation strategy. We con¯rm the results by moving beyond standard panel analysis,
using a random coe±cient model which allows us to use a variety of controls and test why
some countries experience more of an impact from foreign interest rates. We consistently
¯nd the exchange rate regime is the factor driving the magnitude of countries' response to
base interest rates.10
Section 2 describes the empirical framework and any potential bias concerns. Section 3
presents the data and results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Framework
2.1 Panel Model
We examine the direct impact of base-country interest rates on domestic annual GDP
growth. The key advantage of this strategy is that it frees us from many of the estimation
biases which a®ect the empirical literature that examines the impact of domestic interest
7See for example, Canova (2005), Ma¶ ckowiak (2003), and Miniane and Rogers (2006).
8All countries studied °oat their currencies against the U.S. dollar, so there is implicitly no discussion of
exchange rate regime in the analysis.
9Again, there has been study of the way foreign interest rates a®ect local interest rates more in pegged
countries. See Section 3.4.1 where we con¯rm these results in our data for more details. Further, Broda
(2004) considers how exchange rate regimes a®ect the impact of terms of trade shocks.
10Our results are consistent with many other strands in the literature. The fact that only pegged economies
respond to base-country interest rate changes makes sense when one considers that exchange rates tend to be
quite disconnected from macroeconomic fundamentals and that uncovered interest parity does not tend to
hold. For example, see Flood and Rose (1995, 1999) regarding the irrelevance of fundamentals for exchange
rates, and Froot and Thaler (1990) for a discussion of uncovered interest parity.
3rates on real activity. First, the forward-looking bias concern found in the domestic mon-
etary policy literature will be smaller in our estimates.11 Second, it is often di±cult to
disentangle whether the domestic interest rate drives output or vice versa | particularly
for small less-developed countries (Neumeyer and Perri 2005, Uribe and Yue 2006). For
example, poor fundamentals may drive up a country's borrowing costs and also slow output
growth, thus placing further upward pressure on interest rates.
Further, whether the base interest rate is set with respect to base-country conditions in
an expected or unexpected manner is irrelevant for the purpose of this study, since we are
not examining the impact of monetary policy but the total impact of foreign interest rates.
We ask what is the e®ect of interest rates in base countries on domestic countries' output.
This question is explored by estimating the following annual output growth equation in a
panel regression:
yit = ®1 + µRb
it + Á0
1Xit + ºit; (1)
where i represents a given country, yit is annual real GDP growth, Rb
it is the base country
nominal interest rate, and Xit is a matrix of country ¯xed e®ects and other covariates. Rb
it
varies across domestic countries since they have di®erent base countries (see below for a
further discussion). In this case, the OLS estimate of the impact of the base interest rate
on domestic output growth (b µOLS) is identi¯ed since domestic output growth will arguably
not drive the base country's interest rate.
2.1.1 Endogeneity Concerns and Common Shocks
While less a®ected by the classic endogeneity issues of domestic monetary policy empirical
work, there are still a number of potential endogeneity concerns. First, it is possible that
domestic output could in fact drive foreign rates. For example, in a two-country model, if
home productivity falls, capital will °ow to the foreign country and interest rates will fall.
This endogeneity, though, would lead to a positive correlation between foreign interest rates
and local GDP growth, not the negative one found in this paper. We are able to address this
issue by eliminating large home countries that could plausibly a®ect the base interest rates.
There is still a possibility that world shocks in°uence domestic output growth and the base
interest rate contemporaneously. We control for these shocks by including various controls
in the Xit matrix, such as time ¯xed e®ects. Recent tests developed by Pesaran (2004)
11The concern of this forward-looking component of monetary policy has been discussed widely (Bernanke
and Blinder 1992, Bernanke and Mihov 1998, Romer and Romer 1989). Taylor (1993) is the classic paper
that formulates such policy rules, which are now common in the literature. Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (2000)
is an early contribution in the empirical estimation of such rules. See di Giovanni et al. (2005) for a simple
instrumental variable (IV) approach to identify the impact of monetary policy on output growth given a
potential forward-looking bias problem.
4con¯rm that the inclusion of time ¯xed e®ects greatly decreases cross-sectional correlations
of error terms to the point of insigni¯cance in our sample. Furthermore, the endogeneity of
monetary policy in the base country may also bias the estimate of µ. In particular, the base
interest rate may change in response to the base country policymaker's reaction to expected
GDP growth, which might have a direct in°uence on domestic country GDP growth (i.e., on
yit). This e®ect actually biases against ¯nding a strong response of domestic GDP growth,
so we also include base country controls in Xit. Base GDP growth also helps control for
regional shocks that may hit the base and local countries jointly.
It is possible that there are non-global shocks that are not captured by base GDP growth
but do a®ect home GDP growth and base interest rates simultaneously. We think many
of these (e.g., the Asian Crisis and other ¯nancial crises) will lead to both base interest
rates and domestic GDP growth decreasing, which is the opposite of what is implied by our
results. However, we must still acknowledge the possibility of not capturing other shocks
that could raise simultaneity concerns. We further address this issue in Section 2.2.
2.1.2 The Role of Exchange Rate Regimes
The second question that this paper seeks to answer is whether the impact of the base
interest rate on domestic output growth varies across exchange rate regimes. This hypothesis
is tested in the following regression framework:
yit = ®2 + µ1Rb
it + µ2Pegit + °Rb
it £ Pegit + Á0
2Xit + Àit; (2)
where Pegit is a 0/1 dummy variable indicates whether country i is pegged or not to its
base country. Testing the null hypothesis ° = 0 will answer whether there is a di®erence
in the impact of the base country interest rate on domestic output growth across pegs and
°oats. In particular, we expect that ° < 0 if pegs are more a®ected by base-country interest
rates. A matrix of controls, Xit, is also included.
The potential bias due to the endogeneity of base-country monetary policy is again a
concern, but is expected to be larger for pegged countries because these economies are likely
to be more dependent on the base country, thus biasing ° towards zero. That is, if the base
rate is forward looking and pegs are more connected, we are unlikely to ¯nd a signi¯cant
negative ° = 0. On the other hand, if high base rates slow foreign growth below its average
rate, then if pegs are more connected, we might worry the pegs will appear more strongly
a®ected. Again, including base GDP can help control for this directly. Further, we examine
whether trade °ows to the base country move with the base interest rate.
Finally, we address the important concern that pegs and °oats are simply di®erent and
that countries that tend to peg are more a®ected by the base country than °oats regardless
5of the exchange rate regime. We take two approaches. First, we note that most countries
both °oat and peg at some point in the sample. Second, we drop the countries that either
always peg or always °oat and look at the remaining sample. More rigorously, we run a
probit model to predict peg status and trim the sample to exclude observations with a
propensity score that does not have joint support. That is, we exclude all countries with
very low probability of pegging (because pegs rarely do) and countries that are very likely
to peg (because °oats are rarely in that part of the distribution). This leaves a sample of
observations that are quite likely to either peg or °oat. A ¯nal concern is that the base for
°oats is misidenti¯ed, leading to a weaker connection with the base interest rate for these
countries. As described below, the base choice is relatively straightforward, but dropping
countries that always °oat (where it is presumably more di±cult to identify a base), or using
a propensity score to more scienti¯cally narrow the sample helps address these concerns.
2.1.3 Methodological Details
The growth rate of output is considered rather than a detrended level of output. First,
using levels and including lagged output yields a coe±cient extremely close to one on the
lagged output coe±cient, while not a®ecting our other results substantially. Given this
result and potential concerns of heterogeneous dynamics across countries | see Section
2.2 | we choose the parsimonious approach of taking growth rates before running the
regressions. Moreover, the use of growth rates and level of interest rates is not uncommon
in the literature (Bernanke, Gertler and Watson 1997, Hamilton and Herrera 2004), as well
as previous investigations of foreign interest rates' impact on the economy (Frankel and
Roubini 2001, Reinhart and Reinhart 2001). Recent theoretical models also show that the
output-interest rate relationship is one where the deviation of output from a trend steady-
state is dependent on the interest rate (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford 1997).12 Using GDP
growth is similar in spirit to such a concept. It is also worth noting that this paper is not
about long-run GDP growth, but about business cycle frequency acceleration and slowing
of growth caused by base interest rates. We rely on the logic that while the interest rate is
persistent, it is ultimately stationary, and thus the concern that our structure would imply
that a permanently higher Rb would lead to a permanently lower growth rate does not hold
as interest rates cannot be permanently higher.
We experimented with three other detrending methods besides growth rates: (i) linear
detrending, (ii) HP ¯ltering, and (iii) band-pass ¯ltering, which required some additional
12In a less-developed countries context, there is a literature which argues that the length and behavior
of cycles may be quite di®erent for industrial and non-industrial countries. Furthermore, shocks to trend
growth are the primary source of °uctuations in non-industrial markets as opposed to transitory °uctuations
around the trend (Aguiar and Gopinath 2007).
6backcast-forecast techniques given annual data and short samples for some countries. Ap-
plying these di®erent detrending methods present some potential problems. First, it is not
clear what set of "standard" parameter values can be plugged into di®erent ¯lters for emerg-
ing or developing countries. Applying these ¯lters is also di±cult given we do not always
have a full 30 year sample of GDP data for many non-industrial countries (thus the need
for backcast-forecast techniques to obtain reliable band-pass ¯ltered data). Furthermore, in
our main work, we drop observations due to hyperin°ation or obvious outlier years. This
dropping does not seem to bias our baseline growth rate regressions in any particular di-
rection, but does create problems for ¯ltering the data. Second, given that our analysis is
static (i.e., does not incorporate lags of GDP growth or interest rates), it is not obvious
that we would pick up an e®ect using a deviation from a \potential" 13
The standard errors are clustered at the country level. This is the most conservative
clustering setup in that it increases standard errors over other choices such as simply using
robust standard errors or clustering at the base-country level. The latter may be a preferable
choice in that the base interest rate obviously repeats for all countries pegged to the same
base. We choose to use local country clustering in part to be more conservative. Clustering
allows an unspeci¯ed autocorrelation matrix removing concerns of serial correlation in the
error term (see Bertrand, Du°o and Mullainathan 2004). GDP growth is persistent, but
not strongly so. The autocorrelation is only 0.29. Base interest rates are more persistent,
but the overall regression shows only a 0.28 serial correlation in the error. Serial correlation
is even lower when time and country controls are included. Thus, the serial correlation
appears low enough that clustering is a su±cient means to compensate.
The concern of heterogeneity, short time-series samples and the use of annual data also
preclude us from exploring more dynamic speci¯cations. In particular, we do not try to
estimate the timing of the impact of foreign interest rates on the economy (the frequency is
too coarse) but instead the general e®ect of foreign rates and in particular the cross-sectional
di®erence in GDP growth's reaction to foreign rates. It is possible to show, however, that
the estimated interest rate coe±cient summarizes the instantaneous and historical e®ects
of interest rates on the economy.14 The persistence of foreign rates means the current
13For example, consider a case where the domestic economy's output is above potential at period t and
the base country raises interest rates. In our basic framework, if the country's GDP growth falls below
its average (recall we have country ¯xed e®ects), there will be a negative coe±cient on the base interest
rate. However, imagine the case where this slowdown is not large enough such that output drops below
potential at t. In this case, the output gap would appear positive before and after the interest rate change,
and there may not be su±cient variation in the data to pick up the negative impact. That being said, it is
quite possible that output will grow slowly enough to fall below potential at t + 1, and so on. However, we
would have to include lags of output and interest rates to capture this e®ect. As discussed in the paper, this
methodology is impractical given the use of annual data and the potential of heterogeneous dynamics.
14See di Giovanni et al. (2005) for a formal analysis.
7observation contains a great deal of information about the lags. Combined with the relative
lack of persistence in GDP growth, this means the coe±cient on the current year's interest
rate encapsulates the overall e®ect. If we dispense with our concerns about heterogenous
dynamics and include lags, we ¯nd that the coe±cient on the contemporaneous interest rate
drops somewhat, but the sum of current and lagged is nearly exactly equal to the coe±cient
we report on the contemporaneous in our tables.15 Thus, we focus on the non-dynamic
results in our discussion. Finally, the question of whether the e®ect of foreign interest rates
di®ers across exchange rate regimes is ultimately a cross-sectional question.
2.2 Random Coe±cients Model
Estimation of equation (2) poses certain limitations and assumptions, which may not be
optimal. First, it assumes that the impact of the base rate (and other covariates) on
domestic GDP growth is homogeneous across countries at time t, which need not be the
case.16 Second, we would like to interact the base interest rate with other potential controls,
but doing so with too many variables makes the estimation and interpretation of estimated
coe±cients from equation (2) unwieldy. Therefore, given that the focus of the paper is
to examine what cross-country characteristics matter for the impact of the base rate on
domestic GDP growth, we estimate the following system of equations:
yit = X1it¯1i + Rb
it¯2i + !it (3)
¯2i = Zi° + »i; (4)
where X1it is a matrix of country-speci¯c dummies, time dummies, domestic in°ation, base
GDP growth, and oil prices. The Rb
it matrix contains the base country interest rates. A key
assumption underlying equation (3) is that all the coe±cients in ¯1i are allowed to vary by
country, except for the time dummies, which capture common shocks across countries. The
coe±cients for ¯2i are treated as random, and are modeled as a function of country-speci¯c
covariates (Zi) in equation (4). These covariates are country characteristics averaged over
the sample period. For example, one such variables is the average of Pegit over time, where
a 0 would indicate never pegged vs. a value of 1, which would indicate continuously pegged.
Equations (3) and (4) can be combined to produce a Random Coe±cients Model (RCM)
representation of the system:
yit = X1it¯1i + Rb
itZi° + ²it; (5)
15This is true whether we include lags only of the interest rates and interactions or include lags of all
variables including the dependent variable.
16E.g., see Hsiao and Pesaran (2004) and Smith and Fuertes (2004).
8where ²it = Rb
it»i + !it. Thus, the coe±cients in the vector ° capture how the impact of
the base rate on domestic GDP growth varies by country characteristics.17 Note that the
sample is restricted so that countries must have a minimum of ¯fteen observations to be
included in this analysis. Results are robust to including a minimum of twenty observations,
but several countries are lost. We thus opt for ¯fteen observations given the importance of
the cross-sectional dimension of the data.
This econometric technique, along with our broad data set and multiple base rates, allow
us to control for world growth e®ects with time controls, allow country-speci¯c responses to
variables such as oil prices and base country growth that may a®ect countries di®erently, and
control for local in°ation and unobserved country ¯xed e®ects. Such a speci¯cation gives us
far more power to isolate the impact of base interest rates on local economies than previous
studies. In particular, the variable response to base GDP and oil shocks allows di®erential
responses by each country to key world shocks as well as regional shocks. This helps control
for common world shocks, shocks to the base, and allows di®erent country responses to these
shocks, thus helping to isolate the e®ect of the base interest rate on domestic GDP growth.
18 Also, the methodology further helps in controlling for the possibility that countries that
peg are in some way di®erent from those that °oat.
3 Data and Results
3.1 Data
Data sources are described in detail in Appendix A. Most ¯nancial and exchange rate
data comes from the IMF's International Financial Statistics while most real economy data
(GDP, trade levels, etc.) come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The
interest rates used are short-term rates: money market or treasury bill (based on availability,
see appendix). The exchange rate regime classi¯cation and base country designation are
from Shambaugh (2004) and is a de facto classi¯cation, which is described in detail in the
appendix.19
17Following Amemiya (1978) and Hsiao (2003), equation (5) is estimated using Feasible Generalized Least
Squares (FGLS). See Appendix B for details on estimation as well as assumptions and tests of the model.
18As discussed in Section 2.1.1, it is still possible there are shocks positively correlated with base interest
rates that have a negative impact on home GDP growth (in pegs but not °oats) that are orthogonal to these
controls.
19The base countries for pegs are obvious; the base for nonpegs, while conceivably di±cult to isolate, are in
fact almost equally obvious. Most countries generally only peg to one country during the sample and nearly
all peg at some point, thus revealing the base. Further, those that do switch bases, tend to switch directly
from one peg to another (e.g., Ireland in 1979), so no ambiguous middle °oat exists. For the few countries
that do not peg, currency history is used and the dollar in very rare cases (Japan) where no obvious other
choice exists. Two ¯nancial openness variables are used, both based on information from the IMF. One is
a binary variable created by the authors (see appendix) and one a continuous variable from Chinn and Ito
9The sample is limited in a few ways. First, hyperin°ations are eliminated as they are
generally outliers for many of the dimensions of interest (for example, domestic interest
rates). Second, we eliminate countries with annual GDP growth either above 20% or below
¡20%. We view these growth rates as either mistakes in the data or highly unusual circum-
stances that may cloud the results. As it turns out, moving the cuto®s or allowing these
outliers in the data set does not change the results except in a few circumstances where
they appear to strengthen our results. Finally, we drop countries with a population less
than 250,000 as we view them as too small to be representative.
Table A1 lists our country sample and Table A2 shows simple summary statistics. The
sample is divided roughly equally between pegs and nonpegs and the average growth rates
of the two are nearly identical. The growth rate of pegs does exhibit a slightly higher
volatility; an unconditional ¯nding, but one consistent with subsequent work showing that
annual growth rates in pegs are a®ected by base interest rates.
3.2 Panel Estimation
3.2.1 Baseline Results
The most basic result is obtained from estimating equation (1) for the full sample. This
speci¯cation examines if, on average, countries' annual real GDP growth varies with the base
country interest rate. Column 1 of Table 1 shows this result where there is a negative point
estimate, but it is close to zero and not remotely statistically signi¯cant. Thus, on average,
countries do not seem to be a®ected by the base interest rate, or at least the biases towards
zero discussed above dominate any relationship. The second and third columns, though,
show that there is a signi¯cant relationship for pegged countries but none for nonpegs. The
fourth column pools the data and uses the interaction term to highlight the exchange rate
regime e®ect (equation (2)). Again, there is no general e®ect on countries (the coe±cient on
Base R is e®ectively zero) and yet there is a statistically signi¯cant negative coe±cient on
the interaction term. Pegs' economic activity appears to slow down when the base country
interest rate is high.20
These results are economically signi¯cant as well. They imply that when the base
interest rate is 1 percentage point (100 basis points) higher, this cuts 0:1 ¡ 0:2 percentage
points o® of annual GDP growth for pegged countries. Thus, if the base is in a tight
monetary policy period vs. a loose period (often up to a 500 basis point swing in interest
(2005). The sample runs from 1973{2002 for 160 countries, yielding roughly 4000 country/year observations
for most speci¯cations.
20We also note that nonpegs include many countries that are truly between pegging and °oating, but are
not pure pegs or countries that only peg for part of the year. This methodology should blur the distinction
between the two regimes, and makes the ¯nding of a signi¯cant di®erence all the more surprising.
10rates),21 this could have a full percentage point impact on pegged countries annual GDP
growth while having no impact on °oats. Again, these results are likely biased towards zero,
and the gap should be biased down as well.
The positive coe±cient on the peg variable should be interpreted carefully because the
coe±cient on the interaction of peg and base interest rate is negative and the base interest
rate is a positive variable. The mean of the base interest rate is 0.07, and when multiplied
by the ¡0:18 coe±cient on the interaction, we see the mean impact of a peg is zero (0.139
+ ¡0:18 £ 0:07). The lack of an impact on annual growth rates for a pooled sample is
consistent with Husain, Mody and Rogo® (2005).
3.2.2 Fixed E®ects, Other Controls, and Endogeneity Concerns
As discussed, omitted variables and simultaneity are a concern. In particular, world shocks
may raise interest rates and slow down growth around the world, and the base country's
annual GDP growth may have direct e®ects on the domestic country's. Table 2 explores
some of these issues by including a variety of ¯xed e®ects and base-country GDP growth.
First, the regression includes year e®ects to control for worldwide shocks and country ¯xed
e®ects to control for the fact that growth rates may di®er across countries, and other
unobserved non-time varying country characteristics that are correlated with a country's
decision to peg.22 Most data sets are unable to explore such an e®ect because they only
use one world interest rate as opposed to a base interest rate that can vary across countries
depending on the base. The base interest rates are certainly correlated, so including such
year controls takes some power away from the regressions, but it leaves a much improved
identi¯cation that has not previously been exploited. Column 1 shows that year and country
¯xed e®ects alter the regression slightly, but the gap between pegs and °oats is close to
unchanged and remains signi¯cant.
The relevant external growth factor may not be worldwide, but may be more narrow;
thus, we include base GDP growth. In addition, since the empirical work is in part motivated
by the interest parity relationship and the costs of borrowing, it is important to examine
the real cost of borrowing in the domestic country. In this case, the local in°ation rate
is relevant. Column 2 of Table 2 presents our core speci¯cation. The coe±cient on the
gap between pegs and °oats strengthens slightly to ¡0:17 and is signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero at 99 percent. The e®ect on nonpegs is zero. Base growth is positive (as expected)
but insigni¯cant (it is signi¯cant if year e®ects are dropped) and in°ation is negative and
21A one standard deviation change within a given base country's rate is on average 320 basis points.
22In addition to the country ¯xed e®ects controlling for di®erences in growth across countries, we ¯nd that
interacting country factors such as country size with the base rate has no impact on the results.
11signi¯cant.
Beyond the core speci¯cation, the interest parity relationship suggests the expected
change in the exchange rate should be included, so the change in the exchange rate is
included but there is no signi¯cant e®ect. The in°ation rate is highly correlated with the
GDP de°ator's growth rate, and thus it may be problematic to include contemporaneous
in°ation. No impact is found when including lagged in°ation to proxy for expected in°ation,
though now the change in the exchange rate is signi¯cant and negative (in°ation and the
change in the exchange rate are highly correlated).23 It is also noteworthy that the results
change little or not at all if we drop crisis years, drop regime transition years, or drop
observations that Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) describe as \freely falling."24
As the trilemma is motivation of the study, capital controls should also be an impor-
tant consideration. If a country has capital controls, its monetary policy should be less
constrained by the base interest rate even if it is pegged. Thus, we include both a measure
of capital openness as well as the interaction of the base interest rate and capital openness
with the expectation that more open countries will be more a®ected by interest rates in
the base country. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 show a weak result in this direction. Using
the Chinn-Ito variable, the point estimate is negative but not signi¯cant. Using a binary
coding created by the authors yields a negative coe±cient signi¯cant at 90 percent.25
While the inclusion of various ¯xed e®ects and base growth should handle many endo-
geneity concerns, Section 2 notes further issues. First, we con¯rm that large home countries
are not biasing the results. Dropping observations where the home country is 10 percent
the size of the base or more makes no di®erence to the results (dropping down to 1 percent
of base still makes little di®erence). To examine the concern that pegs and °oats may have
di®erent relationships with the base country, we drop countries that always peg or never
peg. The results are even stronger for this subsample, where there is no impact for the
nonpegs and a larger di®erence between pegs and nonpegs than Table 2's results. More for-
mally, we use a probit model to predict pegging and eliminate observations that are almost
certain to peg or not to peg.26 Trimming over a quarter of the sample until there is a clear
23Even when using lagged in°ation, the change in the exchange rate is not signi¯cant if we exclude high
depreciation countries (those depreciating more than 20% in a year).
24We have checked other concerns as well such as dropping all countries using the Euro and there is no
e®ect on the results.
25Including further interactions (peg times capital openness and peg times capital openness interacted
with the base rate) generates slightly stronger results on the interaction of capital openness and the base
rate, but a positive coe±cient on the peg times capital openness interacted with the base rate. Thus, capital
openness and pegging are not purely additive nor do they both need to be active for an impact. A basic
trilemma prediction would be that pegging and capital openness only matter in conjunction, but the result
we ¯nd is consistent with the Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005) results on interest rate e®ects.
26One aspect of the data makes such a methodology both di±cult and possibly unnecessary. This is the
fact that as Juhn and Mauro (2002) note when discussing determinants of exchange rate regimes: \No result
12overlap in the probabilities (all observations have a probability of pegging between 0.2 and
0.6), still leaves us with results similar to Table 2. Dropping the countries that never peg
or are unlikely to peg also con¯rms that improperly de¯ned °oat bases are not driving the
results.
3.2.3 Sub-Samples
Table 3 presents the results across di®erent sub-samples of the data. First, the results hold
in the very broad groupings of less-developed (LDC) and industrial countries (DC). In both
cases, there is a signi¯cant negative relationship for the interaction term of base interest
rate and pegging. There is a small and weakly signi¯cant positive coe±cient on the base
rate for less-developed countries in general, but this is most likely due to the omission of
year e®ects.27 Dividing further by income groupings, there are strong signi¯cant reactions
in high-income, lower-middle income, and lower-income countries. The only grouping not
to show expected results is the upper-middle income. According to geographical groups,
the results are strongest in the Middle East, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. Importantly,
no region has a signi¯cant coe±cient on the non-interacted base rate, so no region shows
evidence of nonpegs being a®ected by the base rate. The results are not always signi¯cant as
sample size shrinks, but it does not appear that they are driven by any one type of country
or region, and they seem to be representative across a broad cross-section of countries.28
3.2.4 Alternate Base Interest Rates
While the results appear robust to a variety of ¯xed e®ects, we continue to explore the
results by taking further advantage of the fact that countries do not all peg to the same
currency. Speci¯cally, we check non-dollar based countries against the U.S. interest rate. If
who countries peg to does not matter, the dollar rate should be important as it is the major
world rate, but if the e®ect is driven by the e®ect on local monetary policy as suggested
appears to be reasonably robust." Nevertheless, we control for basic optimal currency area criteria (economic
size, GDP per capita, trade openness, exports to the base, distance to the base, share of exports which are
fuel) and measures relating to the country (government share of the economy and ¯nancial development).
Along with year e®ects, the predictive power in a linear probability model is not strong, but the coe±cients
signs are as expected. For these and other robustness tables, see Appendix C and Tables A7 and A8.
27We are unable to include year e®ects in these speci¯cations because in some sub-samples there is insuf-
¯cient variation in which country is the base. When we include year e®ects for the less-developed sample,
the positive coe±cient on the base rate disappears while the interaction term remains at ¡0:19 and is still
signi¯cant.
28Much of the previous work on this topic has focused on Latin America. We note that this is the one
region that comes close to having a signi¯cant reaction on the base interest rate regardless of exchange rate
regime. In addition, if one does not exclude the very high in°ation outliers in this region and one does
not control for in°ation and base GDP growth, the coe±cient on base interest rate becomes signi¯cant,
presenting a picture of all countries being a®ected by the base rate. Keeping high in°ation countries in the
full sample does not have this e®ect.
13by the trilemma, only the actual base interest rate should matter. That is, if we see a gap
between pegs and °oats, does this gap exist for all large foreign country interest rates, or
only for the rate of the country to which they have pegged? Table 4 shows that, in the core
regression, dollar-based countries and non-dollar based countries look similar, though the
results are stronger for countries pegged to the dollar. Year e®ects cannot be included in
the dollar sample in column 1 because there is only one base interest rate used. Column 2
is the analogous regression for nondollar countries. Column 3 includes year e®ects as well.
When the U.S. interest rate is substituted for the base interest rate for the non-U.S. based
countries, the only signi¯cant relationship is a positive coe±cient on the non-interacted US
rate. This result is again likely due to the lack of year controls (this result is not apparent
in many other speci¯cations such as the one without country ¯xed e®ects shown in column
5). There is no evidence, though, of a signi¯cant negative coe±cient on the peg times the
U.S. rate in any speci¯cation. Pegs do not respond negatively to the U.S. rate unless they
are pegged to the dollar. These regressions show that pegs are not simply more a®ected by
large-country interest rates, but are a®ected by the interest rates of their base in particular.
3.2.5 Other Controls and Robustness Checks
Before turning to the RCM results, we brie°y summarize other controls and estimation
issues we have considered.29 First, we have run regressions using a dynamic speci¯cation
of equation (2). In particular, we include lagged domestic GDP growth. There is very
little di®erence in the results, most likely because output growth is not necessarily a very
persistent variable (unlike the level of GDP, for example). Real interest rates are used
instead of nominal interest rates. While the rate that is relevant in interest parity or
other international conditions is the nominal rate, we also examine base real interest rates.
Results vary depending on how the base real interest rate is de¯ned (subtracting current
or lagged in°ation from the nominal rate). Alternatively, including the base interest rate
and base in°ation separately continues to give our standard results. In addition, regressions
are conducted across subsets of countries divided by debt levels. Least-indebted countries
appear to be the least exposed to foreign interest rates, yet the core result of pegs reacting
more than °oats appears to hold across quartiles by debt level, though the signi¯cance varies.
Furthermore, since borrowing costs are a potential channel, we check that our results hold
for real investment growth in addition to real GDP growth. Results are even stronger than
our main results in both size and signi¯cance. Again, there is a strong di®erence between
pegs and nonpegs. As noted in Section 2.1.3 we also experimented with di®erent detrending
methods, but believe growth rates are the appropriate technique with annual data from a
29Refer to Appendix Tables A3-A6 for details.
14wide range of country types; in general, results using these other detrending measures were
fragile (see the discussion in Section 2.1.3 for potential reasons).30
Finally, other exchange rate regime classi¯cations are examined. Replicating Table 1
using de jure codes (countries' declared regime status), shows directionally similar but
weaker results. This is not surprising given the fact that some of the observations are
miscoded in the de jure codes mixing pegs and °oats together. Using Reinhart and Rogo®'s
classi¯cation codes (condensed to a binary coding) yields similar, though weaker, results.31
3.3 Random Coe±cients Estimation
We next turn to results from estimating equation (5). As discussed above, using a random
coe±cients framework provides a method that not only allows for greater °exibility in
estimating the impact of the base interest rate on domestic annual GDP growth using the
time series data while controlling for global shocks, but also allows us to take into account
many cross-country controls when trying to explain this impact of the base interest rate.
This estimation methodology con¯rms the importance of the exchange rate regime.
In particular, Table 5 presents the estimated coe±cients for the whole sample and the
less developed country sub-sample, respectively.32 The country-speci¯c variables used in
the regressions (i.e., the X1it variables) include a constant, domestic in°ation, base GDP
growth, and the oil price. Furthermore, a time e®ect is included for all countries. We
also experimented with including exchange rate changes, but, like in the panel estimation,
including this variable does very little to the estimates.
Before turning to the precise quantitative results, the main result can be summarized in
Figure 1. The vertical axis represents estimated coe±cients of the impact of the base rate
30In particular, we obtained results closest to those for growth rates by using the band-pass ¯lter, which
yielded coe±cients of the same size and sign as in our growth regressions, but were insigni¯cant. The simple
linear detrending gave results quite similar to those with growth rates, but only with more complex dynamics
(including lagged base rate and its interaction with the pegged dummy, as well as lagged ¯ltered output).
Including lags raised the concern of heterogeneous dynamics, and the typical bias concerns resulting from
including a lagged endogenous variable in a panel setup, which is not very easy to deal with give that our
sample has large T (i.e., the dynamic panel model will face issues such as weak identi¯cation, and a large
number of lags will make it di±cult to test for the validity of the model).
31Without ¯xed e®ects and controls results are similar, though weaker. With full e®ects and controls
reactions are opposite our results (the base rate is weakly signi¯cantly negative and the interaction term
is insigni¯cant). Finally, we use the disaggregated Reinhart and Rogo® codes as well. Here, with no ¯xed
e®ects or controls, only pegs have a signi¯cant relationship with the base interest rate and only crawling
pegs have strongly signi¯cant reactions with ¯xed e®ects. The results for °oating countries and freely
falling countries are always close to zero and not remotely signi¯cant. Thus, the reactions are not identical
across classi¯cations, but they are similar in a number of speci¯cations. We see an advantage in using the
Shambaugh classi¯cation based on data coverage, availability, and the annual nature of the coding used
which matches the frequency of our other analysis and data. Thus, we use it for the bulk of our analysis.
See Shambaugh (2004) for an extensive discussion of the di®erent classi¯cations.
32Results were broadly consistent for the developed country sub-sample, but statistical signi¯cance is lower
given a smaller cross-sectional component. Results are available from the authors upon request.
15on annual GDP growth, and are calculated from a ¯rst-step estimation of a FGLS procedure
(see Appendix B for details). The horizontal axis represents how pegged a country was over
the sample; i.e., it is an average of the exchange rate regime binary indicator over the period.
A value of zero implies that the country was always a nonpeg, while a one indicates that
country was always ¯xed to its base. The ¯gure depicts a negative relationship, implying
that the average impact of a foreign interest rate on domestic real annual GDP growth will
be larger the more ¯xed a country is on average.
Table 5 shows that this result is robust across all speci¯cations, and is both economically
and statistically signi¯cant. The core result in column 1 indicates that foreign interest rates
being 1 percentage point higher result in a 0.30 percentage point greater impact on annual
real GDP growth for countries that were pegged throughout the sample compared to those
that were °oating, while the impact is 0.29 percentage points for the less developed country
sample. This result is even larger than in the panel regressions now that multiple country
characteristics are included. Given that base-country interest rates can move by up to
500 basis points over a cycle, it suggests a very large impact on pegs versus °oats. The
inclusion of several controls and the high statistical signi¯cance of the peg coe±cient in
Table 5 indicates that the results are robust. Interestingly, the majority of other control
variables are not signi¯cant. However, it is worth noting that the sign of the coe±cients in
general line up with what one would expect.
First, the Trade/GDP coe±cient is generally negative indicating that foreign interest
rates have a larger impact for economies that are open to trade. There is no a priori reason
to expect this result, but trade and ¯nancial openness are strongly correlated, and more
¯nancially open countries may be impacted more by foreign interest rates. Second, the
impact of the base rate on domestic output growth is weaker the more a country exports
to its base country (as a ratio of GDP), which makes sense given the identi¯cation problem
resulting from the forward-looking bias of the foreign monetary policymaker and common
shocks.33 This result is signi¯cant in columns 5 and 6.34 Income variables are not signi¯cant,
except for columns 5 and 6, where low income countries appear to be positively a®ected,
though due to the inclusion of other variables, there are very few low income countries left in
the sample in these speci¯cations. Finally, the capital control variable (KA Open) is never
signi¯cant and the point estimate is practically zero. We have experimented with other
capital controls data (Chinn-Ito), and have not found any strong results for this indicator,
33Note that we also control for this e®ect in the time series part of the estimation by including base GDP
growth in X1it.
34It is also interesting to note that the coe±cient on the peg increases (in absolute terms) when including
the exports to base variable (the speci¯cation with only the peg is not reported, but is available upon
request).
16though the peg variable remains strong.
Financial markets, both domestic and international, may also a®ect how strongly the
domestic economy reacts to movements in the base rate. We therefore examine the impact
of the average level of ¯nancial development, external capital °ows, and ¯nancial openness.
Only the ratio of credit to GDP in column 4 is signi¯cant, and it has a positive coe±cient,
indicating that the base rate has a smaller impact in more ¯nancially developed economy
(viz. credit).35
3.4 Channels
Foreign interest rates should not have a direct e®ect on the domestic economy. However,
they may operate through some channel and have an indirect impact either by a®ecting
domestic interest rates or other variables that contribute to annual GDP growth. In many
ways, the channels have already been tested by examining characteristics and base rates.
The result that pegs are more a®ected than °oats is consistent with an interest rate channel.
Furthermore, the fact that the exchange rate regime is the most dominant characteristic
driving the relationship between base rates and GDP growth in the RCM framework is
again consistent with the interest rate channel.
To further determine through which channel(s) the foreign interest rate operates, we
test a series of variables against the base interest rate and see if they move in a direction
consistent with the direction that GDP growth moves. If there is no relationship between
a particular variable and the base interest rate, this suggests that the channel is not the
driving factor behind our results. Finding signi¯cant relationships does not establish that a
channel is the primary one a®ecting domestic growth de¯nitively, however, but establishes
the existence of a potential channel. This methodology is analogous to that of Kim (2001),
who applies the same identi¯cation strategies he uses to identify the impact of monetary
policy on output to other channel variables (e.g., trade). He then asks what models the
resulting impulses of these variables are consistent with. We do not follow a VAR strategy
to identify monetary shocks, but expect that the impact of base interest rates on economic
variables to di®er given potential channels, as well as across di®erent exchange rate regimes.
3.4.1 Domestic Interest Rate Channel
As noted in the paper, we focus on the direct e®ect of base interest rates on domestic
interest rates. The presumption is that domestic interest rates have some impact on the
35This result points to a potential dampening e®ect of ¯nancial depth on the impact of the base interest
rate on annual output growth. This dampening e®ect of ¯nancial depth has been highlighted in recent work
by Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciµ ere and Rogo® (2006).
17economy, and if movements in base interest rates force movements in the local rate, this
will have an impact on the economy. Thus, we test the impact of changes in base interest
rates on domestic rates.
This channel has been tested in Shambaugh (2004) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Tay-
lor (2004, 2005) with a series of controls and robustness checks. We do not repeat all tests
here but simply check the basic speci¯cations with our data.36 Table 6 shows that domestic
rates do seem to move with base interest rates, but this is driven by pegs. There is no
e®ect on °oats, but the peg interaction term shows a statistically signi¯cant and econom-
ically meaningful coe±cient of roughly 0.4 depending on the speci¯cation, implying that
40 percent of base rate changes are passed through to domestic rates in ¯xed exchange
rate countries.37 Thus, the direct domestic interest rate channel appears to be a possible
explanation for the growth impact. When base interest rates rise, domestic rates in pegged
countries rise. The direction and di®erence between pegs and nonpegs are consistent with
our growth results.
The change in the base rate may not simply a®ect the domestic rate directly, but it may
also change expectations on the exchange rate and the risk premium, causing a change in the
spread between the domestic and foreign rates. Uribe and Yue (2006) note that an increase
in the base rate might not only increase the domestic rate directly, but may also increase the
spread, generating the possibility of a more than one-for-one increase in domestic rates.38
We do not have su±cient foreign currency bond data to create true spreads, and as such,
any regressions on spreads (or really just the interest rate gap) will mirror the results for
interest rates. The fact that no local rate (peg or °oat) reacts more than one for one with
the base rate suggest that the spreads over the base shrink (though more for °oats). Thus,
these results seem to imply there is not a strong spreads channel largely because for most
countries there is no e®ect of base interest rates on domestic rates, and the spread is not
36Shambaugh (2004) discusses the fact that we should be worried about persistence in nominal interest
rates and should consider a speci¯cation in di®erences. We follow that here. Domestic rates are far more
persistent than the other variables we consider for channels, that is why we turn to di®erences only for the
interest rate and spreads regressions.
37These results are also consistent with ¯ndings in Miniane and Rogers (2006) who ¯nd that local interest
rates respond to base interest rates more for pegs. Borensztein, Zettelmeyer and Philippon (2001) also ¯nd
pegs respond more to monetary shocks when looking at a small group of countries. Frankel, Schmukler and
Serv¶ en (2004) agree that short run reactions are slower in nonpegs than in pegs, though they argue that long
run reactions are more similar (cf Shambaugh). Finally, Hausmann, Gavin, Pages-Serra and Stein (1999)
do not ¯nd this relationship when using a small panel of Latin American countries and using real interest
rates.
38They ¯nd that the U.S. rate and the spread can explain up to 20% of domestic aggregate activity. The
standard error bands on the output response to U.S. interest rate changes generally include zero and the
sample size is restricted for data reasons, however. See also Neumeyer and Perri (2005). They examine the
volatility of business cycles in ¯ve emerging economies, discern that real interest rate volatility contributes
to the volatility of the cycle, and that both foreign rates and country risk contribute to the volatility of the
real rate.
18acting like a multiplier of base rate changes, but is simply the residual arising from domestic
rates not moving with the base rate fully.
3.4.2 Exports to Base Channel
The base country interest rate may also have real e®ects in the base country. To the extent
that some countries are economically dependent on the base country, a primary channel
through which this may have a direct e®ect on the domestic GDP growth is changes in
exports to the base country. There are two reasons to be somewhat skeptical that this
channel will have strong e®ects, however. First, to the extent that interest rates in the base
countries are counter-cyclical, one would expect the classic monetary policy result that high
rates are simply o®setting higher expected growth and not actually slowing the economy
down to recession levels. Thus, it would be surprising to see an impact through the growth
rates of the base economy. In addition, base-country GDP growth has been included in the
output growth regressions, and it does not weaken the base interest rate e®ect. Still, we test
here the impact of base rates on exports to the base country to see if there is a possibility
of such a channel.
Table 6 column 2 shows that exports to the base do not move in a direction consistent
with our results. Nonpegs' exports are una®ected, but there is a weakly signi¯cant increase
in exports to the base by pegs. This result ¯ts the theory that base countries may be acting
counter-cyclically and this counter-cyclicality may in fact be mitigating our main results.
It appears that pegs are helped by an increase in exports to the base when the base rate is
high, but that this relationship is overwhelmed by the monetary channel.39
3.4.3 Exchange Rate Change Channel
The base interest rate will potentially move the domestic exchange rate and hence a®ect
the economy through an exchange rate change channel. An increase in the base rate may
cause the base currency to appreciate against all other currencies (that °oat) meaning that
any °oating country will depreciate against the base. Thus, we test the nominal exchange
rate relative to the base country against the base interest rate. Table 6 column 3 shows
the results. There are no signi¯cant reactions to the base interest rate. The peg and
domestic in°ation are the only signi¯cant variables. We see that pegs tend to appreciate (a
negative coe±cient) relative to nonpegs, though country ¯xed e®ects as well as the constant
39The exports to base/GDP series is quite persistent as well, suggesting the possibility of using changes
for this channel as well. When changes in exports to base (divided by GDP) are regressed on changes in the
base interest rate, there is no signi¯cant coe±cient on the interaction, but the non-interacted base interest
rate coe±cient is now small and weakly signi¯cant positive coe±cient implying that the boost in exports
that comes with growing base countries may hit pegs and nonpegs alike. Regardless, this does not seem to
be a channel that explains slower growth when base interest rates are high.
19and other controls obscure the exact pattern. Given the insigni¯cant reaction to the base
interest rate, though, this does not appear to be a primary channel. Given the general
failure of uncovered interest parity to hold for °oating countries, this set of results is not a
surprise.
Thus, while these explorations of the channels are not intended to be de¯nitive on any
one relationship, the one e®ect that seems to both run in the direction that would slow
annual growth and di®er signi¯cantly by exchange rate regime is the impact of base rates
on domestic interest rates. This ¯nding does not establish it as the only channel, but it
seems to be an important one.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that while interest rates in base countries may have an e®ect on other
countries' real economies, this impact only exists for pegged countries. Countries without
a ¯xed exchange rate show no relationship between annual real GDP growth and the base
interest rate, but countries with a ¯xed exchange rate grow 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points
slower when base interest rates are 1 percentage point higher. The results appear robust
to a wide variety of controls and speci¯cations. Controlling for time, region, income, base
country GDP growth, and other controls all present the same picture. In addition, pegged
countries do not respond to any world interest rate, but only the rate of the country to
which they peg | further suggesting the importance of the peg in this relationship. We have
exploited variation in base rates and used RCM techniques to achieve better identi¯cation
and increase con¯dence in the robustness of the results. As discussed in the methodology
section, it is possible that shocks a®ect both base interest rates and local GDP growth
simultaneously, but we have tried to control for these by including year e®ects (to capture
worldwide shocks), base GDP growth (to capture real shocks in the base) and oil shocks as
well as using the more °exible RCM approach.
Our work on channels suggests that the e®ect of the base interest rate on domestic
interest rates in pegged countries is the primary channel through which this impact on
GDP takes place. Pegged countries move their interest rates with the base country interest
rates while °oats do not. On the other hand, there does not seem to be a robust relationship
consistent with the direction that growth moves between the base country interest rate and
other potential channels such as the exchange rate, trade °ows, and the interest rate spread
over the base country.
While the fact that the ¯xed exchange rate countries' growth rates move with the base
interest rate matches our theoretical predictions, the results are surprising on two levels.
20First, the lack of a reaction in the °oating countries runs counter to conventional wisdom
regarding the extent to which large country interest rates a®ect the rest of the world.
Second, with the ¯ndings that the primary channel is the direct interest rate channel, we
add to our understanding of how and why foreign country interest rates matter for pegs
and demonstrate that exogenous domestic monetary policy (moving local interest rates due
to a move in exogenous foreign rates) can have a palpable e®ect on the economy.
For many years, economists have struggled with the di±culty of ¯nding robust macroe-
conomic relationships that vary across exchange rate regime. Recently, there has been
additional work suggesting that monetary policy autonomy, growth, in°ation, and trade
may all vary with the exchange rate regime, at least to some extent. Stretching back
further, Flood and Rose (1995) found a negative relationship between the exchange rate
°exibility and output variability. The results here suggest that being forced to follow the
base country's monetary policy even when it is not optimal for the domestic economy may
cause increased volatility in GDP for ¯xed exchange rate countries.
These results do not suggest that pegging is either a good or bad idea, but instead add
to the calculus of costs and bene¯ts (in this case costs) an economy will face when it ¯xes
its exchange rate. Furthermore, our results suggest that losing monetary autonomy when
pegging has real impacts on the economy. Obviously, by °oating, a country may expose
itself to volatility owing to changes in the nominal exchange rate, but pegging does not
eliminate volatility. Pegging forces a country's interest rates to follow the base country
rates, which may generate more volatility in GDP by eliminating countercyclical monetary
policy as an option.
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24Appendix A Data Appendix
The exchange rate regime classi¯cation comes from Shambaugh (2004) and is described
there in detail. In short, a country is classi¯ed as pegged if its o±cial nominal exchange
rate stays within §2% bands over the course of the year against the base country. The
base country is chosen based on the declared base, the history of a countries' exchange
rate, by comparing its exchange rate to a variety of potential bases, and by looking at
regional dominant currencies. In addition, single year pegs are eliminated as they more
likely represent a random lack of variation rather than a true peg. Finally, realignments,
where a country moves from one peg level to another with an otherwise constant exchange
rate are also considered pegs. Nonpegs are also assigned a base determined by the country
they peg to when they are pegging at other times in the sample. While we typically
use the term \nonpeg" and the more colloquial \°oat" interchangeably, any country/year
observation not coded as a peg is considered a nonpeg, so they are not all pure °oats,
but include all sorts of nonpegged regimes. Shambaugh makes extensive comparisons of
this methodology and other classi¯cations. The de jure measure is based on the IMF
Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements compiled in Shambaugh and extended by
the authors. The Reinhart-Rogo® classi¯cation is from Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) and
is available on Carmen Reinhart's website. Their coding uses parallel market data and
assesses the conditional probability an exchange rate will move outside a certain range over
a ¯ve year window. See Reinhart and Rogo® for more detail. In some speci¯cations, we
collapse the ¯ve-way classi¯cation into a binary one, considering all observations that are
not coded pegs as nonpegs.
There are two ¯nancial openness variables used. One is the ¯nancial openness variable as
de¯ned by Chinn and Ito (2005). This is a continuous index based on information across four
major categories of restrictions in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements.
The other variable, is a binary indicator created by the authors based on data from the
IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements line E2, which signi¯es \restrictions
on payments for capital transactions." For 1973{95, we begin with data provided by Gian
Maria Milesi-Ferretti and augment it with data from Shambaugh (2004). After 1995, the
IMF stopped reporting this series and reported disaggregated information. The series is
extended for 1996{2002 using changes in the disaggregated coding and descriptions in the
yearbook to determine changes in the binary codes. Shambaugh discusses the coding in
more detail including the fact that this series is highly correlated with other more detailed
or disaggregated measures.
Our ¯nancial °ows and debt variables are updated data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2001). The Credit/GDP variable is de¯ned as private credit by banks and other Financial
institutions to GDP, and comes from the updated ¯nancial Development and Structure
database of Beck, DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Levine (1999), which can be found at
http://econ.worldbank.org.
The rest of the macroeconomic data come from standard sources. Real GDP, oil prices,
M2/GDP, Trade/GDP, income levels, and regional and income dummies come from the
World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. Exchange Rates and in°ation
come from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics database.
Interest rates are from the IFS as well as Datastream and Global Financial Database. The
interest rates used are short term rates, either money market or short term treasury bill.
Which rate is used depends on availability with money market used as a default if both are
available (the two are highly correlated). When local rates are regressed on base rates, we
are careful to match local and base rates to be the same type. Exports to the base country
are derived from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
25Appendix B Estimation of RCM Model
The RCM regression presented in Section 2.2, equation (5), can be re-written in the following
matrix notation:
y = X1¯1 + X2Z° + ²; (B.1)
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and note that ¯2 = Z° + » and that ² = X2» + !.
The vector y contains output growth, X1 is a matrix of year dummies (YEAR) and
country-speci¯c variables that vary over time (e.g., base country output growth, in°ation,
oil price, etc.) and a country-speci¯c intercept, X2 is a matrix of base country interest
rates, and Z is matrix of country variables that are averaged over the sample period (e.g.,
the average time a country is pegged, or has capital controls). By making parts of X1 and
X2 block-diagonal, we allow country dynamics to be heterogenous.40 Finally, the coe±cient
matrix of interest, °, relates country \fundamentals" (Z) to the average dynamic impact of
the base country interest rate (X2) on output growth (y). The null hypothesis is that this
impact will be negative for countries that are pegged more on average: °1 < 0.
We assume that ! and » are both independent, normally distributed errors with mean
zero, and are independent of each other. The main reason for making these assumptions
is tractability in the estimation procedure. Imposing a common coe±cient on year e®ects
helps alleviate any cross-country correlation arising from global shocks in the ! vector.41
Furthermore, including these dummies and the impact of oil prices also helps alleviate au-
tocorrelation in the errors of !. By forcing » to be distributed independently across sections
and homoscedastic, we are assuming that the ¯2;i's are uncorrelated across countries, and
have a constant variance. Inspection and tests of the covariance matrix of equation (4)
40Tests of coe±cient homogeneity rejected the null hypothesis of equality.
41See Hsiao and Pesaran (2004), Section 9, on the di±culties of modeling cross-section correlation when
N is large (> 10) and for a discussion on other possible ways to model cross-section correlation in a RCM
set-up. Note that a SURE framework would not work since N > T in our sample. Furthermore, including
common year e®ects greatly alleviates cross-sectional correlation as in the panel regressions according to the
test statistics developed by Pesaran (2004).
26indicate that these are reasonable assumptions to make. Finally, assuming that ! and »
are independent implicitly assumes that the dynamic and cross-sectional error structures
are uncorrelated, which is standard in panel analysis. Many of these assumptions can be
relaxed by using GMM estimation techniques, but would result in a loss of e±ciency.
Given the assumptions made on the error structure, one can easily apply a two-step
FGLS estimation technique based on Amemiya (1978), and found in Hsiao (2003). In
particular, ¯rst regress y on X1 and X2 and calculate a variance-covariance matrix, §1.
Next, take the estimated country-speci¯c base rate coe±cients, b ¯2, and regress these on
Z to produce OLS estimates of °, b °OLS.42 The variance-covariance matrix, §2, of these
estimates is then calculated taking into account the uncertainty of the estimated base rate
coe±cients from the ¯rst regression. The ¯nal output of this ¯rst-step procedure is a
total variance-covariance matrix, which is the sum of the two variance-covariance matrices
(§1 + §2) and is block diagonal. This matrix captures the uncertainty of the estimated
¯ and ° coe±cients. The second-step of the procedure is to estimate equation (B.1) by
weighting with this total variance-covariance matrix. This estimation produces the most
e±cient estimates of °, b °GLS, and b ¯1, b ¯1GLS.
Appendix C Trimming the Sample Based on the Probability
of Pegging
As noted in the paper, one concern with the results may be that pegs and nonpegs are simply
di®erent, and that one di®erence may be that pegs are more tied to the base economy in
some way. This appendix examines attempts to trim the sample in order to control for this
problem.
First, we note that most countries peg and °oat in the sample; thus, pegs and °oats
are not set in stone and always separate. There are 152 countries in the full regressions in
Table 2. If we cut all full pegs (26 countries) and full °oats (30 countries) we are left with
96 countries. Column 1 of Table A7 reproduces column 2 of Table 2 (our core speci¯cation)
for comparison purposes. If we drop countries that always peg and °oat, our results are in
fact stronger, with ° increasing to ¡0:21 and still no impact on nonpegs.
We also use a propensity score to restrict the sample. First, we estimate a probit
model to predict peg status. Next, we drop observations that have almost no likelihood
of pegging or °oating, focusing instead on the middle of the propensity score distribution
where countries might peg or °oat. As noted in the text, the exchange rate regime choice
literature is not particularly successful at ¯nding robust patterns in the data. Still, we can
follow Juhn and Mauro (2002) and add optimal currency area variables as well as variables
regarding the government role in the economy, ¯nancial depth, and capital controls. We do
not add macro variables as they are quite likely outcomes not determinants. Year e®ects
are also included to capture changes in the probability of pegging over time.
Table A8 shows both a linear probability model (estimated with OLS) and a probit,
where the predicted values are capped to stay between zero and one. The R2 is only 0.11,
so the predictive power is not strong. However, coe±cients are reasonable in sign: richer,
more closed, more ¯nancially developed countries are less likely to peg. Countries with large
fuel exports, tied to the base country, closer to the base country, with more government
intervention tend to peg more often. Many coe±cients are not statistically signi¯cant when
clustering the standard errors appropriately, and size of the economy (GDP) never is. One
reason for the low predictive power is that the explanatory variables are relatively time
invariant, but the same countries move back and forth between pegging and not pegging.
42It is these estimated ° that are plotted against the average peg variables (Z1) in Figure 1.
27It is quite easy to say that Belgium is more likely to peg to Germany than it is to Japan,
but harder to say whether it will peg to Germany in 1982 vs. 1985.
Figure A1 shows the density of the probability of pegging for pegs and °oats. The ¯gure
itself is informative. It shows that while the tails of the distributions for pegs and °oats are
di®erent, in general, pegs and °oats are not too di®erent. In fact, the median score for pegs
is 0.45 and for °oats is 0.35. These are not radically di®erent types of countries. To con¯rm
that the tails are not driving our results, we take the 5th percentile in the distribution of
pegs (0.21) to be the mark below which pegs rarely occur and the 95th percentile (0.64)
for °oats to be the point above which °oats rarely occur. As the ¯gure shows, within those
bounds, we have a fair overlap of the distributions. Restricting the sample here drops over
1
4 of the sample, but the results are close to our core regression. Column 3 shows our
core regression for the sample for which we have data to estimate the probit. Results are
e®ectively the same as column 1. Column 4 shows that after restricting the sample based on
propensity scores, our results are quite similar to before. ° is slightly closer to zero, but still
signi¯cant and there is still no statistically signi¯cant relationship for nonpegs. Trimming
the sample less aggressively (at the lower and upper 1 percentage points of the distribution,
0.16 and 0.76, respectively) eliminates 7% of the sample, and the results are almost entirely
unchanged. There is a fair bit of support in both distributions at the 1 percent mark,
suggesting that is probably the appropriate place to limit the sample. Moving our cuto®s
further in than the 5th percentiles begins to eliminate large parts of the sample (as can be
seen from the ¯gure).
We view these results as supportive of the contention that our core results are not being
driven by a bias stemming from the choice of the exchange rate regime. Furthermore, as
noted in the paper, by dropping countries that never peg or are highly unlikely to peg, we
have eliminated countries for whom the designated base may be a bad match (either may
be incorrectly assigned or may simply be a country to which the home country is unlikely
to peg). This makes it less likely that results are driven by inappropriately selecting the
base for °oating countries.
28Table 1. The E®ects of the Base Interest Rate on Real Output Growth: Baseline Least
Square Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Nonpegs Pegs Full Sample
Base R -0.046 0.046 -0.137** 0.046





Constant 0.036** 0.030** 0.043** 0.030**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 3831 2078 1753 3831
R2 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.005
Notes: The table gives OLS estimates of the e®ect of the base country nominal interest rate on annual
real economic growth. The sample period is 1973{2002. Estimates in columns (1)-(4) do not include any
additional controls. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. + signi¯cant at 10%; *
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
29Table 2. The E®ects of the Base Interest Rate on Real Output Growth: Additional
Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base R -0.046 -0.014 -0.015 -0.019 -0.042 -0.011
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Base R£Peg -0.137* -0.174** -0.171** -0.168** -0.143** -0.159**
(0.053) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049)
Peg 0.010* 0.011** 0.011* 0.010* 0.006 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
In°ation -0.029** -0.024* -0.011 -0.023*
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Lagged In°ation 0.000
(0.001)
Base GDP Growth 0.113 0.112 0.117 0.165* 0.139+
(0.076) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080) (0.075)
¢ NER -0.008 -0.024** -0.020+ -0.008
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
KA Open 0.015**
(0.005)
Base R£KA Open -0.119+
(0.063)
KA Open (Chinn-Ito) 0.003*
(0.002)
Base R£KA Open (C-I) -0.010
(0.021)
Observations 3831 3419 3415 3385 3117 3380
R2 0.177 0.204 0.203 0.197 0.210 0.205
Notes: The table gives OLS estimates of the e®ect of the base country nominal interest rate on annual real
economic growth.The sample period is 1973{2002. Country and year e®ects are included. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the country level. + signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
30Table 3. The E®ects of the Base Interest Rate on Real Output Growth: Sub-Samples of
the Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full LDC DC HI UMI LMI LI
Base R 0.053 0.073+ -0.013 0.001 -0.022 0.104* 0.098
(0.032) (0.039) (0.044) (0.041) (0.075) (0.049) (0.081)
Base R£Peg -0.170** -0.195** -0.260** -0.242* 0.021 -0.341** -0.213*
(0.047) (0.053) (0.072) (0.101) (0.120) (0.087) (0.088)
Peg 0.016** 0.019** 0.013** 0.013* 0.007 0.032** 0.015+
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009)
In°ation -0.025** -0.025** -0.028 -0.009 -0.014 -0.041** -0.017+
(0.007) (0.007) (0.024) (0.015) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010)
Base GDP Growth 0.248** 0.200** 0.492** 0.613** 0.221* 0.085 0.100
(0.048) (0.055) (0.066) (0.084) (0.092) (0.077) (0.075)
Observations 3419 2753 666 883 518 923 1095
R2 0.173 0.165 0.300 0.330 0.169 0.216 0.117
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
EAP ECA LACA MIDNA SA SSA
Base R 0.050 0.016 -0.055 0.122 0.061 0.073
(0.063) (0.053) (0.094) (0.099) (0.112) (0.074)
Base R£Peg -0.061 -0.307** -0.020 -0.491* 0.026 -0.203**
(0.207) (0.079) (0.125) (0.201) (0.122) (0.071)
Peg 0.020 0.016* 0.012 0.030* 0.000 0.010
(0.018) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
In°ation -0.032 -0.059** -0.009 -0.011 -0.015 -0.017
(0.032) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.031) (0.010)
Base GDP Growth 0.399** 0.402** 0.335** 0.024 0.092 0.109
(0.102) (0.078) (0.100) (0.251) (0.063) (0.077)
Observations 454 814 679 339 153 950
R2 0.238 0.322 0.124 0.134 0.177 0.122
Notes: The table gives OLS estimates of the e®ect of the base country nominal interest rate on annual real
economic growth. The sample period is 1973{2002. The estimates are based on speci¯cation (2) of Table 2,
and include country, but no year e®ects. The following country classi¯cations are used LDC (less developed),
DC (developed/industrial), HI (high income), UMI (upper middle income), LMI (lower middle income), LI
(lower income), EAP (East Asia and Paci¯c), ECA (Europe and Central Asia), LACA (Latin America and
the Carribean), MIDNA (Middle East and North Africa), SA (South Asia), and SSA (Sub Sahara Africa).
Classi¯cations based on World Development Indicators. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country
level. + signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
31Table 4. Considering Non-Base Interest Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dollar Non-Dollar Non-Dollar Non-Dollar Non-Dollar
Base R 0.083+ -0.035 0.031
(0.047) (0.045) (0.060)
Base R£Peg -0.198* -0.116* -0.127*
(0.076) (0.058) (0.060)
Peg 0.020** 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
U.S. R 0.091* 0.054
(0.042) (0.046)
U.S. R£Peg -0.043 -0.028
(0.065) (0.075)
In°ation -0.027** -0.014 -0.031 -0.020 -0.013
(0.008) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Base GDP Growth 0.191** 0.326** 0.184
(0.064) (0.069) (0.121)
U.S. GDP Growth 0.243** 0.245**
(0.068) (0.067)
Constant 0.025** 0.031** 0.036** 0.021** 0.024**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Country FE yes yes yes yes no
Year FE no no yes no no
Observations 2065 1354 1354 1406 1406
R2 0.176 0.190 0.236 0.174 0.016
Notes: The table gives OLS estimates of the e®ect of the base country nominal interest rate on annual
real economic growth. The sample period is 1973{2002. Estimates in columns (1)-(5) do not include any
additional controls. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. + signi¯cant at 10%; *
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
32Table 5. Explanation of Base Interest Rate Impact on Real Output Growth: Random
Coe±cients Model
Full LDC Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peg -0.301* -0.287* -0.450* -0.289* -0.467** -0.448**
(0.114) (0.119) (0.158) (0.122) (0.149) (0.142)
KA Open 0.045 -0.089 0.041 0.165 -0.140 -0.164
(0.148) (0.181) (0.201) (0.167) (0.160) (0.151)
Trade/GDP -0.113 -0.230 -0.219 -0.184 -0.269 -0.270
(0.121) (0.164) (0.205) (0.140) (0.196) (0.183)
Exports to Base/GDP 0.796 0.561 1.367 0.701 2.104+ 1.941+
(0.822) (0.824) (1.100) (0.848) (1.033) (1.026)
High Income -0.106 -0.065 -0.278 -0.049 -0.051
(0.140) (0.208) (0.169) (0.138) (0.135)
Lower Mid Income -0.115 0.053 -0.092 0.086 0.068
(0.135) (0.173) (0.140) (0.137) (0.136)
Low Income -0.123 0.094 -0.083 0.548* 0.509*
(0.141) (0.190) (0.153) (0.218) (0.218)










Observations 2681 1936 2233 2477 1637 1662
Countries 99 73 86 92 59 60
R2
whole 0.369 0.348 0.374 0.386 0.449 0.451
R2
¯2 0.135 0.151 0.163 0.182 0.331 0.350
Notes: The table give the RCM estimates of the coe±cients b ° from the model yit = X1¯1i + X2Zi° + ²it,
where X1 is a matrix containing country speci¯c intercepts, base country GDP growth, real oil prices, and a
matrix of year dummies, X2 is a matrix of base country interest rates, and Zi is a matrix of the variables in
the table, which have been averaged over the sample period per country. `Full' refers to the full sample of
countries and `LDC' refers to less developed countries. R
2
whole refers to the R
2 from estimation of equation
(5). R
2
¯2 refers to the R
2 from estimation of equation (4) | this is done using estimates from a ¯rst-step of
a FGLS procedure. The sample period covers 1973{2002. Estimates are calculated using a FGLS estimator,
as described in Appendix B. + signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
33Table 6. Potential Channels
(1) (2) (3)
¢Own R Exports to Base ¢NER
Base R -0.064 -0.120
(0.077) (0.213)






Peg -0.011 -0.025+ -0.070**
(0.009) (0.015) (0.020)
In°ation 0.156** 0.018** 0.593**
(0.055) (0.006) (0.032)
Base GDP Growth -0.017 -0.002 0.216
(0.079) (0.061) (0.136)
Observations 1933 3236 3503
R2 0.204 0.573 0.550
Notes: The table gives OLS estimates of the e®ect of the base country nominal interest rate on domestic
nominal interest rates, export to base, and changes in the exchange rate. The sample period is 1973{2002.
Country and year e®ects are included. Estimates in columns (1)-(4) do not include any additional controls.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. + signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; **
signi¯cant at 1%.










































































































































































































Australia (1) Germany (4) Portugal (7) South Africa (10)
Belgium (2) India (5) United States (8)
France (3) Malaysia (6) United Kingdom (9)
Notes: Superscript refers to base country. A country may have multiple bases over the sample period.
Furthermore, all base countries, except for the United States, have a base country. Approximately 60% of
the countries in the sample have the U.S. as a base vs. 40% that are non-U.S. based.
35Table A2. Sample Summary Statistics
Full Pegs Nonpegs
Observations 3831 1753 2078
Mean GDP Growth 0.033 0.033 0.033
Std Dev GDP Growth 0.047 0.052 0.043
Mean Base R 0.072 0.075 0.070
Std Dev Base R 0.034 0.036 0.033

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table A4. Di®erent Cuts of the Data to Exclude Outlier Periods and Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No No No Free No
Full Transition Crisis Fall Bases Cut 10%
Base R -0.014 -0.029 -0.036 -0.002 -0.018 0.007
(0.046) (0.051) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049) (0.054)
Base R£Peg -0.174** -0.157** -0.159** -0.193** -0.180** -0.189**
(0.050) (0.058) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)
Peg 0.011** 0.008 0.009* 0.013** 0.012** 0.013**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
In°ation -0.029** -0.025** -0.025** -0.011 -0.029** -0.030**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
Base GDP Growth 0.113 0.093 0.115 0.136+ 0.107 0.077
(0.076) (0.081) (0.078) (0.076) (0.080) (0.075)
Observations 3419 2938 3212 3129 3169 3020
R2 0.204 0.202 0.212 0.209 0.200 0.199
Notes: The table gives OLS estimates of the e®ect of the base country nominal interest rate on domestic
nominal interest rates. The sample period is 1973{2002. Country and year e®ects are included. \No
Transition" refers to periods where a country moves from peg to °oat or vice versa. In this case, the
year before pegging the ¯rst year of pegging, the last year of pegging and the ¯rst year after pegging are
all dropped. \Crisis" is based on the de¯nition suggested by Frankel and Rose (1996): any year where
depreciation is greater than 25% and is at least 10% more than the previous year's depreciation. \Free
Fall" refers to observations deemed to be freely falling (large depreciation and high in°ation) by Reinhart
and Rogo®. \No Bases" drops base countries from the analysis. The U.S. is automatically dropped in all
regressions, but, other bases, such as France, are both a base country for some other countries and a domestic
country (with Germany as the base). \Cut 10%" refers to cutting large countries, as de¯ned as countries
with GDP at least 10% of base country GDP. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. +
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table A7. Core Regressions on Trimmed Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Drop 100% Peg Prop. Score 5th Pctile 1st Pctile
Core and Nonpeg Available Trim Trim
Base R -0.014 -0.003 -0.04 -0.088 -0.063
(0.045) (0.053) (0.054) (0.060) (0.055)
Base R£Peg -0.174** -0.209** -0.172** -0.138* -0.155**
(0.049) (0.063) (0.054) (0.062) (0.053)
Peg 0.011** 0.014** 0.011* 0.008+ 0.009*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
In°ation 0.113 0.112 0.11 0.139+ 0.140+
(0.074) (0.087) (0.073) (0.083) (0.076)
Base GDP Growth -0.029** -0.036** -0.033** -0.027** -0.031**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 3419 2334 3017 2325 2825
R2 0.204 0.24 0.194 0.203 0.199
Notes: The table gives OLS estimates of the e®ect of the base country nominal interest rate on annual real
economic growth.The sample period is 1973{2002. Country and year e®ects are included. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the country level. + signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
41Table A8. Probability Models to Generate Propensity scores
(1) (2)
OLS Probit
Govt share of economy 0.004 0.010
(0.005) (0.013)
Bank Credit to GDP -0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002)
Fuel share of exports 0.003* 0.008*
(0.001) (0.004)
Distance to base -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP (in dollars) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Real GDP per capita -0.000+ -0.000+
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital controls -0.129* -0.373*
(0.064) (0.175)
Trade to GDP 0.115 0.313
(0.099) (0.269)






Notes: The table gives OLS and Probit estimates of the probability of a country pegging to a given base
country.The sample period is 1973{2002. Year e®ects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the country level. + signi¯cant at 10%; * signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.



































































































































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Exchange Rate Regime (1973−2002)
Notes: This ¯gure plots the estimated impact of the base interest rate (b ¯2i) from running regression (3)
against the average of the Peg indicator over the sample period for each country.












0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Pr(jspeg)
Notes: This ¯gure plots the probability densities of either pegging or not pegging. Dashed line: density for
nonpegs solid line: density for pegs dashed vertical lines represent 1% trimming points solid vertical lines
represent 5% trimming points.
44